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PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
DALMAS H. NELSON*
I. FR o M OF ExPRmssIOT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Although the right to freedom of expression has become more
narrowly circumscribed for everyone in recent years, the abridgments
of this right that the courts have held may constitutionally be imposed
on public employees are exceptionally extensive. This has been justi-
fied basically in terms of the doctrines that public employment is a
privilege which the government may extend or withdraw at will and
upon such terms as it chooses, and that denial of public employment
does not constitute punishment. The upshot is that in this area the
government may act with almost complete arbitrariness, even when
basic rights such as freedom of expression are involved.
A considerable amount of administrative and legislative discretion
in matters of public personnel management seems clearly to be
essential to modern government. Crucial issues arise, however, when
in the exercise of their discretion administrative authorities or legis-
latures invade the constitutional rights of public employees.
1. Constitutional Restrictions
Early restrictions on public employees' constitutional rights largely
involved police and fire departments or employees in "police power"
activities where discipline of a quasi-military sort is an important
consideration.1 Upon this ground the courts have sustained sanctions
imposed on firemen for violating departmental rules against "publicly
criticizing the official action of a superior officer"2 and imposed on
firemen and policemen for violating restrictions on the joining of labor
unions.3 With regard to public employees in general, there is some
conflict among the judicial decisions on the power of the government
to forbid its employees to form unions. But in most instances the
courts have "agreed that the determination of the right of association
*Instructor in Political Science, University of Nebraska. The author is
indebted to Professor Robert G. McCloskey of Harvard University for valuable
criticisms and suggestions in the preparation of this paper. Sole responsibility
for what is said in it rests with the author.
1. Sherman, Loyalty and the Civil Servant, 20 RocKY MT. L. REv. 381, 387
(1948).
2. State ex rel. Curtis v. Steinkellner, 247 Wis. 1, 10, 18 N.W.2d 355 (1945).
3. Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 Atl. 234 (1923); McNatt v. Lawther,
223 S.W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180
S.E. 410 (1935).
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in the government service is inherently a policy-making function
which will rarely be subject to judicial limitations."4
The largest category of restrictions on freedom of expression by
government employees that the courts have upheld concerns the right
to engage in political activity. In Ex parte Curtis5 the Supreme Court
sustained the congressional prohibition of all but a specified top-level
category of federal officers and employees from "requesting, giving to,
or receiving from, any other officer or employ6 of the government,
any money or property or other thing of value for political pur-
poses...." In United States v. Wurzbach6 the Court upheld the applica-
tion of this prohibition to members of Congress and to candidates for
Congress. A vast extension of this type of prohibition, to political
activities generally, was sustained in United Public Workers of Ameri-
ca (CIO) v. Mitchell,7 discussed below.
It has been held that the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply to testimony by a federal employee which
will cost him his job. It applies only, said the court, where testimony
requested will subject the employee "to either criminal prosecution
or imposition of a penalty under a federal law"; and the loss of a posi-
tion is not "a forfeiture of a right."8
Under the comprehensive federal loyalty program, the holding of
a government position has been made contingent upon loyalty as
adjudged on the basis of the employee's associates and political views
as well as his actions. This raises serious problems concerning such
constitutional rights as freedom of speech, press, association and
assembly, the right to engage in political activity, and the right to
petition for redress. The President's loyalty program was held con-
stitutional in Washington v. Clark.9
Section 9A of the Hatch Act 10 provides that it is illegal for a federal
employee to belong to an organization advocating overthrow of the
4. GODINE, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 64 (1951). For
instance, prohibitions against the joining of unions by city employees were
-upheld in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947),
and CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
5. 106 U.S. 371, 374 (1882).
6. 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
7. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
8. Pfitzinger v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 1, 2, 3 (D.N.J.),
af'd, 192 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1951). In a number of recent state cases the
courts have upheld removals of public employees for refusing to testify
in loyalty or other investigations on the basis of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. See Board of Educ. v. Eisenberg, 129 Cal. App. 2d
732, 277 P.2d 943 (1954) ; Faxon v. School Comm'n, 120 N.E.2d 772 (Mass. 1954);
Lerner v. Casey, 138 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Daniman v. Board of
Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), rehearing denied, 307 N.Y. 806, 121
N.E.2d 629 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 933 (1955).
9. 84 F. Supp. 964, 967 (D.D.C. 1949), affd, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
ajfd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 923 (1951).
10. 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C.A. § 118j (Cum. Supp. 1950).
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government, and by executive order the Attorney General is author-
ized to provide administrative officials with listings of subversive
organizations." These listings are to be considered by such officials in
deciding individual employee cases. A lower federal court has held
that Section 9A of the Hatch Act and the executive order authorizing
these designations by the Attorney General are constitutional.'2 The
decision of the lower court was reversed by the Supreme Court, but
the reversal turned on the procedure involved in the making of the
lists rather than on the constitutional power to make such lists. Under
the recent Adler 13 decision, a state may disqualify for employment in
its schools any teacher who advocates forceful overthrow of the gov-
ernment. And the fact of advocacy may be presumed if the teacher
is a member of any organization administratively determined, upon
notice and hearing, to be an organization advocating forceful over-
throw of the government, and if the teacher knows the organization
advocates such overthrow. If the teacher holds membership in an
organization under these circumstances, the burden may constitution-
ally be placed on him to prove his non-adherence to the organization's
principles.14
Many loyalty oaths have been prescribed in federal, state and local
governments in recent years. Most of the requirements have con-
cerned affirmation of present non-belief in particular political doctrines
and present non-membership in certain kinds of organizations. This
type of oath, imposed as a condition for a government job, benefit, or
legal right to carry on certain activities, has generally been held
constitutional. 15 Under the decision in Gerende v. Board of Super-
visors16 a candidate for public office may be required, in order to gain
a place on the ballot, to take an oath disclaiming any attempt force-
fully to overthrow the government, and disclaiming membership in an
organization which advocates such overthrow. The Gerende case
applied to present affiliation, but in the Garner case' 7 the Supreme
Court sustained an oath requiring city employees to reveal past con-
nections with "subversive groups." This constitutionally retroactive
result arose from the fact that the oath applied only to the period
following the enactment of a city charter provision which prohibited
(with regard to city employees) the items later incorporated in the
11. 65 STAT. 615 (1951), 5 U.S.C.A. § 631 (Supp. 1954).
12. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir.
1949), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
13. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
14. Id. at 492, 496.
15. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 268, 274, 275 (1951). The leading case here is
American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, rehearing denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950). See, e.g., Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App. 2d 481, 199
P.2d 429 (1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 327 (1949).
16. 341 U.S. 56, 57, rehearing denied, 341 U.S. 923 (1951).
17. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, rehearing denied, 342 U.S.
843 (1951).
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oath. The Court in the Garner case also sustained a requirement that
each employee file an affidavit with information concerning any past
membership in the Communist Party or "Communist Political Asso-
ciation."18
Clearly, a finding by the government that an employee is disloyal, or
lacks sufficient loyalty, is an extraordinarily severe blow to that per-
son's reputation and to all his subsequent employment opportunities,
public or private. It has been held, however, that the courts do not
have jurisdiction to review dismissals made upon such findings, since
by long tradition the courts "will not review managerial acts, not
clearly arbitrary, of executive officials performed within the scope of
their authority, and will not substitute their judgment.., for that of
the officials."'19 And under the holding of Bailey v. Richardson2o a
government employee may be fired on a charge of disloyalty without
right of knowing or questioning the accusers, and without any expla-
nation of the reasons.
- 2. Limitations on Restrictions
The foregoing is the main outline of what appear to be the
restrictions that may constitutionally be imposed on the freedom of
expression of public employees. But there are some limitations which
the Constitution imposes in this field. One limitation arises from the
fact that when government acting as an employer infringes upon the
constitutional rights of individuals, there must be a reasonable rela-
tionship between the restrictions imposed and a constitutional legisla-
tive objective.21 In general the courts have imposed this test upon
governmental action as an employer,22 but it is certainly not a sharp
limitation.
A Missouri test oath requiring candidates for the public office, as
well as voters, ministers and attorneys, to swear that they had never
been rebels against the United States, or aided rebellion, or expressly
sympathized with rebellion, was struck down by the Supreme Court
as an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder. 23 The Court held that
"disqualification from office may be punishment." The Court at this
same time also held unconstitutional on the same grounds a similar
18. Id. at 720.
19. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F.2d 22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 838, rehearing denied, 331 U.S. 865 (1947).
20. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
21. See the opinion of Justice Reed for the majority in the Mitchell case:
"Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by the Bill of Rights
and that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican,
Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee
shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.' None would
deny such limitations on congressional power. . . ." 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
22. See Note, 45 ILL. L. Ray. 274 (1950).
23. Cummings v. State, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
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federal test oath upon federal attorneys. 24 Said Justice Field for the
Court's majority: "[E]xclusion from any of the professions or any
of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in
no other light than as punishment for such conduct. '25 In United States
v. Lovett 26 the Supreme Court invalidated, as a bill of attainder, the
attempt of Congress to bar permanently specified individuals from
government service because of their political opinions. Permanent ex-
clusion from the public service is punishment, said the Court, "of a
most severe type." Further, in the recent Garner case 27 the Court in-
dicated that the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws
limit the power of the government as employer. It is clear, therefore,
that the government may not as an employer impose ex post facto laws
or bills of attainder. In the light of these cases it might be considered
that legislation barring individuals or definite classes from public
employment because of political opinion or affiliation is unconstitu-
tional.2 However, a distinction has been drawn by the courts between
a bar to employment that is imposed as a punishment for past conduct
and one that is the effect of "reasonable qualifications" prescribed for
employment.29 In this manner measures have been upheld which, as
we have seen, disqualify persons for government employment on the
basis of their political beliefs or associations. At any rate, the consti-
tutional limitations imposed by the bill of attainder and ex post facto
clauses evidently have, under the recent cases, only a very restricted
application in this field of government activity.
In Atkin v. Kansas,30 involving a state law which regulated the
working hours of public employees and employees of public contrac-
tors, the Supreme Court described in sweepingly broad terms the
power of the state acting as an employer. The Atkin case was made
the basis for the holding of Heim v. McCa' 31 that a state may, despite
the fourteenth amendment, completely bar aliens from employment
on public works. These cases seem to indicate that a state may act
as employer without any regard to the fourteenth amendment. A num-
ber of state courts have specifically so held.32 Moreover, in Snowden v.
Hughes the Supreme Court held that "an unlawful denial by state
action of a right to state political office is not a denial of a right of
24. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
25. Id. at 377.
26. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
27. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
28. See Note, 60 HARv. L. REV. 779, 783 (1947).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
31. 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
32. Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68 Kan. 765, 75 Pac. 1034 (1904); State v. Caldwell,
170 La. 851, 129 So. 368 (1930), appeal dismissed, 282 U.S. 801 (1930); Nash-
ville v. Martin, 156 Tenn. 443, 3 S.W.2d 164, 166 (1928); Scopes v. State, 154
Tenn. 105, 112, 289 S.W. 363, 364 (1927).
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property or of liberty secured by the due process clause."33 And in
Bailey v. Richardson34 and Washington v. Clark35 it was held that due
process requirements do not limit government as an employer. How-
ever, in the Adler case the state statute, as we have seen, imposed
a presumption of disqualification on a teacher who belonged to a
listed subversive organization. The Supreme Court assumed that
under due process requirements the presumption could not constitu-
tionally be made more than a rebuttable one, nor could it apply to
those who did not know the subversive purposes of the organizations
to which they were affiliated.36 The Court similarly assumed the due
process clause to require a knowledge of the subversive doctrines of the
organization in the Gerende37 and Garner38 cases, involving loyalty
oaths. And in Wieman v. Updegraff39 the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional as a denial of due process an Oklahoma test oath which
disqualified persons from public employment on the basis of organi-
zational membership without regard to their knowledge of the nature
of the organization. There are, moreover, several decisions by state
courts to the effect that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment prevents states from arbitrarily or discriminatorily ex-
cluding persons from public employment.
40
In sum, there are certain constitutional limitations on the powers
of the federal and state governments in dealing with their employees.
But these are very broad limitations, and in most instances they are
vaguely defined. The courts have actually given Congress and the
state legislatures an almost completely free hand in this area.
33. 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944), rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
34. 182. F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
35. 84 F. Supp. 964, 967 (D.D.C. 1949).
36. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
37. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 57 (1951).
38. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
39. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). On the authority of the Wieman case some state
courts have recently held that the Constitution prohibits arbitrary exclusion
of persons from government jobs. Nathanson v. Adams, 207 Misc. 572, 138
N.Y.S.2d 598, 601 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Haynes v. Brennan, 135 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902,
903 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
40. Terry v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 108 Cal. App. 2d 861, 240 P.2d 691 (1952);
Hamilton v. Brennan, 203 Misc. 536, 119 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Gianatasio
v. Kaplan, 142 Misc. 611, 255 N.Y. Supp. 102, 105, 106 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 257
N.Y. 531, 178 N.E. 782 (1931), appeal dismissed, 284 U.S. 595 (1932); Ekern v.
McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595, 618, 619 (1913). In the Gianatasio case
the court evidently considered the privileges and immunities clause as well
as the equal protection clause to limit the state as employer. For judicial
dictums that there are certain broad limits on the discrimination that can be
imposed in public employment, see Thorp v. Board of Trustees of Schools for
Industrial Educ., 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462, 469, rev'd, 342 U.S. 803 (1951) (cause
then moot); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, 431 (1915), affl'd, 239
U.S. 195 (1915).
In a case involving the suspension of a fireman for public criticism of his
chief, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the decision of the lower court
ordering the fireman's reinstatement. Although the court did not mention the
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II. RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL AcnTry
1. The Hatch Act Cases
One of the most significant abridgments of the constitutional rights
of public employees that the courts have sustained concerns the right
to engage in political activity. The leading case is United Public
Workers (CIO) v. Mitchell,41 which sustained the Hatch Act of 1939.
The act prohibits all officers and employees of the federal government,
with the exception of a few top-level officers, from taking "any active
part in political management or in political campaigns.' 42 In a com-
panion case, Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission,
43
the Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act of 1940, which applies this
prohibition to state and local officers and employees mainly employed
in activities partly or entirely supported by federal funds.44 The
sanctions in the case of federal employees include removal from office.
To enforce the statute on the state and local level the Civil Service
Commission is authorized in effect to compel removal of the alleged
offender through the power of the federal government to withhold a
designated amount of federal funds.
The scope of the Hatch Acts in terms of the number of persons in-
volved and the kinds of activities proscribed is truly enormous.
45
Fourteenth Amendment, it held: "We approach danger when we allow an
employee to be disciplined for criticizing or voicing a want of regard for
his superior's abilities. . . . An employee may express himself freely so
long as he does not impair the administration of the service in which he
is engaged." St. Petersburg v. Pfeiffer, 52 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1951). And see
also Kane v. Walsh, 295 N.Y. 189, 66 N.E.2d 53, 56 (1946).
41. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
42. 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C.A. § 118i(a) (Cum. Supp. 1950).
43. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
44. 54 STAT. 767 (1940), 5 U.S.C.A. § 118k (Cum. Supp. 1950).
45. The acts incorporated the proscriptions previously set out by the Civil
Service Commission with regard to federal civil servants. These types of
activity "in general" are:
"1. Participation, except as a spectator, in politidal conventions. 2.
Active participation, including speaking, in party primary meetings or
caucuses. 3. Organizing, conducting, or addressing a public political meet-
ing or participating in a political parade. 4. Holding the office of political
committeeman. 5. Organizing, holding office in, or addressing a political
club or committee thereof. 6. Soliciting, receiving, or otherwise handling
political funds. 7. Distributing campaign literature. 8. Publishing or con-
tributing to a partisan newspaper or publishing any letter or article for or
against a party candidate or faction. 9. Any activity at the polls except
voting. 10. Initiating or circulating nominating petitions. 11. Running for
public office. 12. '[E]mployees are forbidden to become prominently
identified with any political movement, party, or faction, or with the
success or failure of any candidate. . . .'" Esman, The Hatch Act-A
Reappraisal, 60 YALE L. J. 986, 990 (1951).
What is left for the public employee? He may: "1. Vote. 2. Contribute to
campaign funds [but he is restricted here with regard to place and re-
garding fellow employes] .... 3. Join political organizations. 4. Attend
political meetings. 5. Participate actively in civic associations or civic
betterment groups. 6. Sign petitions. 7. Wear badges (but not at work).
8. Speak or write publicly on political subjects so long as they are not
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Although Justice Reed, for the majority,46 seemed at one point in
the Mitchell opinion to acknowledge that public employees' consti-
tutional rights to free expression existed, and that the court must
"balance" these "against the supposed evil of political partisanship," he
in fact went on to hold the act valid in terms which denied that these
constitutional rights applied in any way to the case at hand. In hold-
ing the act constitutional the Court cited Ex parte Curtis and United
States v. Wurzbach as precedents, and attempted to buttress its de-
cision further by the separate arguments of administrative efficiency
and the purification of the political process. Partisan political activity
by employees may adversely affect employee morale, it may make
difficult the "orderly management of administrative personnel," it
creates the danger that promotions may become based upon political
activity rather than merit, and it may produce partiality in adminis-
trative services to and regulation of the public as a result of political
considerations. On the political-process side, Congress may have
legitimately desired, in placing this restriction, to avoid a one-party
system, to ensure that political parties serve the public interest to a
greater degree than they could if public employees were "over-active
politically," and to prevent political leaders from using government
employees to create and develop political machines. 47
But Justice Reed implied that all these considerations do not really
matter because the congressional judgment is conclusive. The pro-
hibition on political activities may not be necessary but this "does
not mean that it is not desirable or permissible" under the Constitution.
Congress and the Executive are responsible for the "discipline and
efficiency of the public service." "For regulation of employees it is not
necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reason-
ably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public
service." The courts will not interfere unless the restriction imposed
"passes beyond the general existing conception of governmental
connected witli political campaigns [but see below, p. 183]" Esman, supra
at 990-91. These allowable activities perhaps appear to leave the employce
a great deal. But, as Morton R. Godine points out, "their substance is in
fact negligible for the reason that they prevent civil service participation
in political activity during election periods or the public expression of
staff opinion upon issues which have become sufficiently vital as to be
made the subject of partisan controversy." GODmE, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 183. It is clear that the acts are sweeping in their coverage. Yet they leave
some very serious questions only vaguely answered (see p. 37 infra.), but the
Court upheld them anyway.
46. It was a five-to-two decision. Justices Jackson and Murphy took no
part. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Black (with
Justice Rutledge agreeing) dissented, maintaining that the Hatch Act was too
broad in its restrictions to be justifiable under the first amendment and that
it also probably violated the right of citizens under article I and the seven-
teenth amendment to vote in federal elections and "to have their votes
counted." Justice Douglas dissented in part, holding that although the act
could perhaps validly apply to employees in the "administrative" category,
it could not do so with regard to "industrial" workers. 330 U.S. at 95.
47. 330 U.S. at 95-101.
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power." And "that conception develops from practice, history, and
changing educational, social and economic conditions." In this connec-
tion Justice Reed mentioned that there are a number of "court de-
cisions upon similar problems," a long-standing practice by the Civil
Service Commission of requiring civil servants to be politically neutral,
and a "large body of informed public opinion."48 Under Justice Red's
reasoning any constitutional rights of anyone could be freely abridged
by Congress so long as the abridgment had some "reasonable" relation-
ship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Presumably the Court meant
to confine this result to public employees. It is clear that, although
the only direct reference to the privilege doctrine is in a footnote,
49
this view of public employment was assumed by the Court, so that the
public employee was regarded as being in a special category.
In the Oklahoma case the Court applied the privilege doctrine in
another form to uphold the Hatch Act of 1940.50 The Court in effect
evaded the issue as to the constitutional right of state and local em-
ployees to engage in political activity by referring to the Mitchell
decision.
The upshot of the Mitchell decision and the general line of related
cases is that the government may act arbitrarily in hiring and firing,
and that entrance into the public service means entrance into a second-
class status, so far as constitutional rights are concerned. It seems fair
to say that much of the willingness on the part of the courts to
sanction this development arises from the fact that public administra-
tion theorists and civil service reformers have sometimes been so
concerned with efficient and impartial administration and with the
reduction of political corruption that they have failed to give adequate
attention to the problem of protecting the constitutional rights of those
who work for the government. There appears in many instances to
have been a tendency to assume either that there are no constitutional
problems involved, or that if there have been any they were clearly
and soundly resolved by the Mitchell decision.5' In view of the
extensive and constantly increasing restrictions that are being im-
posed on public employees under the "cold war" atmosphere of the
current scene, and in view of the large influence that the Mitchell case
48. 330 U.S. at 95-103.
49. Justice Reed quoted Justice (then Judge) Holmes's classical statement
of the privilege doctrine in McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
518 (1892). 330 U.S. at 99 n.34. See p. 40 infra.
50. The Court said that "while the United States . . .has no power to
regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it does have
power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be
disbursed." 330 U.S. at 143. Justices Black and Rutledge dissented, and Justices
Murphy and Jackson did not participate.
51. See, for examples of these views: L. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 334-37 (4th ed. 1955); WILMERDING, GOVERNMENT BY
MERIT 231 (1935); Epstein, Political Sterilization of Civil Servants: The
United States and Great Britain, 10 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 281, 283 (1950); Heady,
The Hatch Act Decisions, 41 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 687, 697 (1947).
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and the reasoning and doctrines that underlie it have had on this
whole development, it seems crucially important to raise the question
whether the Mitchell decision is really sound from the standpoint of
constitutional law and political and administrative theory.52
2. The Cases and General Constitutional Doctrine
The Mitchell case should, in the first place, be evaluated in terms
of the general constitutional law regarding freedom of expression.
Secondly, tests should be applied to the particular rationales that the
Court supplied for its holding. The Court's decision was preceded by
several state court holdings sustaining prohibitions of political activi-
ties by public employees. Significantly, these state cases exhibit a
large amount of consistency in the criteria applied to test the prohibi-
tions and in the reasoning pursued by the courts. Moreover, with one
minor exception, all of the rationales employed by the state courts
appear in the Mitchell opinion.
In deciding the Mitchell case the Court strikingly departed in two
basic respects from the general path of constitutional law concerning
freedom of expression: namely, in the matter of presumption of con-
stitutionality and in the matter of vagueness. It is well-established
judicial doctrine that where the unconstitutionality of a statute is
alleged the courts will presume the statute to be constitutional if
there is a "rational" connection between the statute and a purpose that
lies within the legislature's delegated powers. However, the freedoms
guaranteed by the first amendment occupy a "preferred position." The
Court has held that in such cases only the existence of extraordinary
and grave exigencies can justify the restrictive measures. 53 But even
though these fundamental rights were involved in the Mitchell case,
the Court adopted the "rational basis" test, abandoning its judgment
to the legislature. This action of the Court seems all the more remark-
able in view of the nature of the right involved in the case. There are
certain rights of national citizenship that do not depend on the first
or fourteenth amendment but are implied by the republican character
of our government. Among these are the right to petition Congress
for redress "or for anything else connected with the powers or the
duties of the national government"54 and the right to assemble and
to discuss national laws and to supply information to other citizens
with regard to such laws.55 Similarly, the right to engage in political
activity is an inherent right of citizenship, a fundamental requisite to
the democratic process, and it involves even more than freedom of
52. The most penetrating criticism of the case that has appeared is Wormuth,
The Hatch Act Cases, 1 WESTERN POL. Q. 165-73 (1948).
53. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 104 (1940).
54. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
55. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939). And see Wormuth, supra note 52,
at 165.
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speech, association and assembly.5 6 It does not appear, therefore, that
the summary dismissal of questions of constitutional right by the
Court in the Mitchell opinion was justifiable. Moreover, the Court
refused to weigh the potential suppression of constitutionally protected
conduct that is involved in the broad sweep of the statute. It had been
judicial doctrine that it is not enough to save such a statute that the
particular conduct in the case at bar could constitutionally be pro-
hibited.57 But it was enough for the majority of the Court in the
Mitchell case. Under the vague language of the statute and the
opinion58 some very large questions as to what the public employee
can do and say without risking valid sanctions under the statute are
left unclear.5 9
3. The Court's Reasons for Upholding Constitutionality
The justifications offered by the Court in its opinion sustaining the
Hatch Act of 1939 are a composite of the following elements: (1)
precedents, (2) the privilege doctrine, (3) the needs of public admin-
istration, (4) the needs of the political process, and (5) legislative
discretion in the light of what the Court called the "general existing
conception of governmental power." These also embrace the rationales
that the state courts have supplied in upholding Hatch-type measures
on the state and local level.
a. Precedents
The Court in the Mitchell case relied, as we have seen, on Ex parte
Curtis and United States v. Wurzbach, and the lower courts have
similarly relied on the Curtis decision. But actually the statutes in-
volved in the Curtis and Wurzbach cases were of a very different
nature from the broadly restrictive legislation involved in the Mitchell
case and in the bulk of the state cases. The former were "narrowly
drawn" to meet a specific evil, namely the right of federal employees
56. See Santiago v. People, 154 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 1946); Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 153 P.2d 966, 975, 976 (Cal. App. 1944), aff'd,
28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946); Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 156 Fla. 682, 24 So.
2d 108, 110 (1945).
57. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940), and Note, Political
Sterilization of Government Employees, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 295, 298 (1947).
See also, on the problem of vagueness in statutes infringing on freedom of
expression, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
58. Said. Justice Reed: "It is only partisan political activity that is
interdicted. It is active participation in political management and political
campaigns. Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities
and matters of public interest, not an objective of party action, are un-
restricted by law so long as the government employee does not direct his
activities toward party success." 330 U.S. at 100.
59. "After more than a decade, the question whether the Hatch Act may
constitutionally prevent a federal employee from speaking in a political
campaign is still in doubt. If thousands of federal employees have refrained
from making speeches they want to make, because they cannot afford to risk
their jobs, their freedom of speech is effectively curtailed. . . ." Davis, Stand-
ing, Ripeness and Civil Liberties: A Critique of Adler v. Board of Education,
38 A.B.A.J. 924, 926 (1952).
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to get political contributions of money from other federal employees,
inasmuch as such channels in fact provided the means of extortion.
Justice Reed in the Mitchell case thought that the Hatch Act and the
Curtis statute were analagous, since the latter was aimed at monetary
contributions and the Hatch Act was aimed at "political contributions
of energy." But a crucial distinction exists. In the Curtis case (and
the Wurzbach case) every other avenue of political contributions of
money was left open, and the Court in the Curtis case indicated that it
was this fact which saved the statute from unconstitutionality.60 The
Hatch Acts, on the other hand, close every avenue of political action.
Ex parte Curtis is, therefore, instead of a valid precedent for the
Mitchell holding, actually "authority against the Hatch Acts,"'1 and
it was so interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in
Louthan v. Commonwealth.
6 2
b. The Privilege Doctrine
As we have seen, a statute prohibiting political activity by public
employees takes from those who work for the government constitu-
tional rights which are retained by private citizens. When a court
is faced with the problem of deciding the constitutionality of a Hatch-
type statute, and it wants to hold the act valid, it is logically com-
pelled to find some way to justify this discrimination. For this purpose
the courts have usually resorted to the doctrine that working for
the government is a privilege and not a right, and that therefore
the public employee is a special case. This privilege doctrine
thoroughly pervades the case law on public employment. The Supreme
Court relied on it in the Mitchell case. In the great majority of cases
on the state level upholding Hatch-type measures the courts have
60. See 106 U.S. at 373, 374.
61. Wormuth, supra note 52, at 172.
62. 79 Va. 196, 204, 52 Am. Rep. 626, 631 (1884). Here the court held
unconstitutional a state statute forbidding certain state officers to be politically
active. The court relied on Ex parte Curtis in finding the statute to be a
denial of the constitutional rights of citizens. This appears to be the only case
in which a prohibition of political activity by public employees has been in-
validated. However, in Rosenfelder v. Huttoe the Supreme Court of Florida
held invalid the dismissal of a police officer where the dismissal had been
based in part on an alleged violation of a city charter provision against "taking
part in a political campaign." The court did not find the provision unconsti-
tutional but merely held that the action of the officer did not violate the
charter. It justified its decision however by stating: "Neither is it competent
for administrative officers, by rule or otherwise, to unduly restrict one's
activity in a political campaign. Commerce in political opinion is essential
to democratic government....
"The City Charter does not attempt to define what constitutes taking part
in a political campaign.... Some practices the Legislature may unquestionably
forbid, but when it does it must provide a yard stick to measure them by....
Freedom of suffrage and political expression are as essential as freedom of
the press." 156 Fla. 682, 24 So. 2d 108, 109, 110 (1945).
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relied on it.63 It has similarly provided a rationale in cases sustaining
various other kinds of restrictions on the freedom of expression of
public employees. 64 And it has been relied on in many cases involving
government employees but not their freedom of expression.65 The
63. Ricks v. Department of State Civil Serv., 200 La. 341, 8 So. 2d 49,
58, 59 (1942); McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892);
State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. Ham v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 163 S.W.2d 990,
996 (1942); People ex tel. Clifford v. Scannel, 74 App. Div. 406, 414, 77 N.Y.
Supp. 704, 710 (1st Dep't 1902), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.Y. 606, 66 N.E. 1114
(1903); Stowe v. Ryan, 135 Ore. 371, 296 Pac. 857, 862 (1931); Commonwealth
v. Hasskarl, 21 Pa. Dist. 119 (1912); Duffy v. Cooke, 239 Pa. 427, 86 Atl. 1076,
1077 (1913) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hasskarl, supra); McCrory v. Phila-
delphia, 345 Pa. 154, 27 A.2d 55 (1942) (following Duffy v. Cooke, supra).
In a case involving a statute similar to the one in Ex parte Curtis the court
also relied on the privilege doctrine. People v. Murray, 307 Ill. 349, 138 N.E.
649, 650 (1923).
64. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952); Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46, 60, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam equally divided, 341 U.S.
918 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 84
(D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Pfitzinger v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 1, 2, 3 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam,
192 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1951); Washington v: Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C.
1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by equally divided
court, 341 U.S. 923 (1951); Board of Educ. v. Eisenberg, 129 Cal. App.
2d 732, 277 P.2d 943 (1954); Hirschman v. Los Angeles County, 231 P.2d
140 (Cal. App. 1951), aff'd, 39 Cal.2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952); Steiner v.
Darby, 88 Cal. App. 2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 237
(1949); Perez v. Board of Police Conm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537
'(1947); Goldsmith v. Board of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157, 225 Pac. 783 (1924);
Faxon v. School Comm'n, 120 N.E.2d 772 (Mass. 1954); Detroit v. Division 26
of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employof Amf America, 332 Mich. 237, 51
N.W.2d 228, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 882
(1952); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 333 U.S. 852 (1948); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239,
206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Thorp v. Board of Trustees, 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d 462,
469, rev'd on appeal, 342 U.S. 803 (1951) (cause had become moot); Daniman
v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373, rehearing denied, 307 N.Y. 806,
121 N.E.2d 629 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 933 (1955); Lerner v. Casey,
138 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W.
363, 364 (1927); CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946);
Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the American Federation of Teachers
v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 944 (1930), 72 A.L.R. 1215 (1931).
65. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903); Boone v. State, 170 Ala.
57, 54 So. 109, 111, 1912C Ann. Cas. 1065 (1911); State ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 81 S.W.2d 419, 421, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 616 (1935);
Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745, 750 (1932); Christal v.
Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416, 419 (1939); People ex rel.
Gullett v. McCullough, 254 Ill. 9, 20, 98 N.E. 156 (1912); Mosley v. Board of
Comm'rs, 200 Ind. 515, 165 N.E. 241 (1929); State ex rel. Jones v. Sargent, 145
Iowa 298, 124 N.W. 339, 342, 27 L.R.A. (N.s.) 719 (1910); Goodrich v. Mitchell,
68 Kan. 765, 75 Pac. 1034, 1036 (1904); Lewis v. Omaha, 153 Neb. 11, 43 N.W.2d
419, 422 (1950); Coleman v. School Dist., 87 N.H. 465, 183 Atl. 586 (1936);
People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, 430, aff'd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915);
Gianatasio v. Kaplan, 142 Misc. 611, 255 N.Y. Supp. 102, 105 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
257 N.Y. 531, 178 N.E. 782 (1931), appeal dismissed, 284 U.S. 595 (1932);
Commonwealth ecx rel. School Dist. v. Tice, 282 Pa. 595, 128 Atl. 506 (1925);
Hockman v. Tucker County Court, 75 S.E.2d 82, 85 (W. Va. App. 1953). In
contrast to these cases is the holding that there is a constitutional right to
work for the state in Terry v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 108 Cal. App. 2d 861, 240
P.2d 691 (1952). And cf. Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1955),
where the court refers to "the constitutional right of certain persons to
engage in the occupation of teaching...."
The courts have many times held to the effect that public office is not
a "property right." See, e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900), and
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statement of the theory by Justice (then Judge) Holmes has been
very extensively quoted by the courts, in whole or part:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employ-
ments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his con-
stitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied
terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the
employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle,
the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within
its control.66
The doctrine may at first glance seem obvious, simple, and sound.
But this apparent nature of the doctrine disappears upon closer
analysis.
In the first place, the privilege doctrine overlooks the fact that
government is a trustee of the public interest, and the general
public has a stake in the exercise of their freedom of expression by
government employees. Further, "To uphold a contract of employ-
ment by the state without considering the constitutional prohibitions
involved is like upholding a peonage contract without discussing
the Thirteenth Amendment."
67
There is, moreover, considerable judicial doctrine in cases outside
the field of public employment which either expressly repudiates
the privilege doctrine as such, or repudiates it in particular applica-
tions. Thus in Frost v. Railroad Commission the Supreme Court held
that a state may not "require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights" as a condition for the receipt of a benefit or privilege. 68 And in
Terral v. Burke Construction Co. the Court held that it is uncon-
stitutional for a state to attempt to condition the grant of the "privilege
of a foreign corporation's doing business in the state" upon the
Hillel v. Borough, 106 N.J.L. 481, 150 Atl. 385 (1930). There are a few
cases to the contrary, however. See Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 156 Fla. 682, 24 So.
2d 108, 110 (1945), and State ex rel. Ryan v. Norby, 118 Mont. 283, 165 P.2d 302
(1946). According to the court in the Norby case, "while... most courts have
held that a public office is not property, there is a growing tendency on the
part of courts to recognize a property interest therein at least for certain
purposes."
66. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
67. Wormuth, supra note 52, at 172.
68. 271 U.S. 583, 593, 594 (1926). In Danskin v. San Diego Unified School
Dist. the Supreme Court of California held: "A state is without power to
impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege
even though the privilege is the use of state property." 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885, 891 (1946). See also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946),
and the dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
In two recent state cases involving attempted exclusion of persons with
subversive affiliations from public housing projects, the courts explicitly
criticized and rejected the privilege doctrine in holding the exclusionary
measures unconstitutional. Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 Ill.
2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954), and Lawson v. Housing Authority, 70 N.W.2d
605 (Wis. 1955).
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corporation's "waiver of the exercise of its constitutional right to
resort to the federal courts. .... -69 In the field of public employment,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that the legislature
cannot impose unconstitutional conditions on the holding of a govern-
ment job,70 and the Supreme Court of Florida invalidated a statute
requiring entrants into the civil service to waive their judicial reme-
dies concerning disputes with the civil service board, and providing
that board decisions on dismissals from the service should not be
judicially reviewable2 1 Moreover, certain doubts about the privilege
doctrine as applied to public employment appear in the recent opinion
of the Supreme Court in Wieman v. Updegraff.72 In sum, the consti-
tutional law with regard to the privilege doctrine is deplorably
muddled and contradictory.
It is not surprising that the constitutional law is chaotic in this re-
gard if one considers the privilege theory from an additional stand-
point, namely, the inner logic of the doctrine itself. It is in fact im-
possible to grasp what logic it really rests upon. It is of course in-
controvertible that no particular individual has an absolute right
to a government job. But it does not follow from this that the govern-
ment may deny employment to everyone. Yet even if this latter propo-
sition is granted-and it seems to be implicit in the privilege doctrine-
it does not follow from it that the government may discriminate
against the constitutional rights of government employees. Exclusion
of everyone would not be discrimination 3 The conclusion seems
inescapable that the privilege doctrine is really incapable of solving
anything, and it certainly confuses everything. If it is logically ap-
plied, it means that the public employee has no constitutional rights
whatever. But, as we have seen, the courts have made it clear that
he does have some. It cannot help to clarify matters to say that be-
cause no one has a right to public employment the public employee
may be denied some constitutional rights but not others. The privilege
doctrine seems simply to spare the courts of the task of giving an
intelligible reason for sustaining a denial of a constitutional right.
Ours is a democratic society based on a theory of limited, constitu-
tional government. It may well be doubted whether the doctrine that
government may condition the receipt of its benefits on a waiver of
69. 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922). And see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas
ex tel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
70. Morgan v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 131 N.J.L. 410, 36 A.2d 898, 900 (1944).
And see Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1955).
71. Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 20 So. 2d 912, 914 (1944). And see
the discussion above of the judicial decisions regarding the constitutional
limitations on the power of the government to restrict the freedom of expres-
sion of its employees.
72. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See also the dissent bf Justice Frankfurter in
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. at 724-29.
73. See Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 99, 108
(1916).
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constitutional rights, and in that way be enabled to act arbitrarily,
is one which a society like ours can afford to hold.
74
c. Administrative Justilcations
In the Mitchell case and in about half of the decisions in the state
courts sustaining Hatch-type statutes, the prohibitions on political
activity were justified in terms of the need for administrative effi-
ciency, impartiality, and faithfulness on the part of public employees.75
It is said that it would be highly inconsistent to expect or require "a
political party on coming into power to retain . . . employees who
have actively and notoriously worked for its opponents." 76 Partisan
activity by public employees gives rise to promotions and other types
of rewards on the basis of political labors rather than merit, and
this in turn disrupts employee morale.77 Moreover, public servants
are compensated for the restrictions on their political activity by the
fact that they "can very properly make their opinions heard through
the mouths of their political superiors, whom it is their right and
duty to advise."78 The danger of control of an agency by outside
politicians in the place of the agency head and the possibility of loss
of public confidence in the bureaucracy are other major reasons given
in support of the principle of the Hatch Acts.
7 9
74. See McCloskey, The McCarran Act and the Doctrine of Arbitrary Power,
in PUBLIC POLICY 228, 246-48 (Friedrich and Galbraith 1953), and Note,
Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights Through Ex-
pansion of the Conditioned Privilege Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J. 520 (1953).
75. See School City v. Sigler, 219 Ind. 9, 36 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1941); State
ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. Ham v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 163 S.W.2d 990 (1942);
State ex rel. Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763, 42 N.W.2d 796, 799 (1950); Stowe
v. Ryan, 135 Ore. 371, 296 Pac. 857, 862 (1931); Lennox v. Clark, 87 Pa. D. &
C. 289, 307, 308 (C.P. 1952), aff'd in part, nodified in part, and rev'd in part,
372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953); Commonwealth v. Hasskarl, 21 Pa. Dist. 119
(1912); Brownell v. Russell, 76 Vt. 326, 330, 57 Atl. 103 (1904). In Sarlls v.
State ex rel. Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270, 276 (1929), the court sustained
a Hatch-type statute without any explanation, giving only a citation to People
v. Murray, infra. And cf. Ex parte Darnell, 76 So. 2d 770, 781 (Ala. 1954).
The Court in Ex parte Curtis, dealing with a statute that placed certain
restrictions on political contributions and solicitations of money, also relied
on administrative efficiency as a justification. 106 U.S. 371 (1882). So also
did the court with regard to a similar statute in People v. Murray, 307 Ill. 349,
138 N.E. 649 (1923).
76. MERIAM, PUBLIC PERSONNEL PROBLEMS 288 (1938).
77. WILMERDING, op cit. supra note 51, at 234. Thus in a few cases the
courts have justified Hatch-type statutes in terms of benefit to the employee.
This involves an attempted extension of Ex parte Curtis. It is reasoned that
suppression of his political activity removes from the employee the hazards
of disqualification for or removal from office because of his political activity
or lack of activity. See the opinion of the lower court in United Federal
Workers, CIO v. Mitchell, 56 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1944); Duffy v. Cook, 239
Pa. 427, 86 Atl. 1076, 1077 (1913), followed in McCrory v. City, 345 Pa. 154,
27 A.2d 55 (1942); and State ex rel. Green v. City, 33 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ohio App.
1940).
78. WILMERDING, op. cit. supra note 51, at 237.
79. Id. at 231-37; Esman, supra note 45, at 994-95.
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What considerations should be weighed against these? The evils
against which the Hatch Acts are directed are largely hypothetical.80
And the Acts cut both ways in their impact on the nature of the public
service. It may well be questioned whether entrance into public service
of individuals of high caliber can be maintained on an adequate scale
if such entrance puts them into a sub-citizenship status so far
as their constitutional rights are concerned. Moreover, the Acts
in part, at least, . .. attempt to eliminate issues of broad citizen concern
from the range of legitimate employee interests. The result of such
policies is to concentrate the attention of the bureaucracy upon a narrowly
exclusive preoccupation with the material conditions of employment
and virtually to assure the indifferent performance of public functions
as well as to balk the emergence of a vital and creative citizenship
among the ever-expanding ranks of government employees. 81
This observation is particularly serious in the light of the fact that
the bureaucracy is inescapably involved, on several organizational
levels, in policy making. It "is not just an instrument to carry out a
will formed by the elected Congress and President. It is itself a
medium for registering the diverse wills that make up the people's
will and for transmuting them into responsible proposals for public
policy. '82 Given the tremendously influential position of the bureau-
cracy in our government, and the magnitude of the role of govern-
ment in our modern life, the argument seems persuasive that "it
is of critical importance that the bureaucracy be both representative
and democratic in' composition and ethos. '8 3 By imposing barriers
80. The empirical knowledge about the effects of political activity by public
employees is evidently in a state of great uncertainty. Here is surely an
area which deserves more inquiry by researchers.
In defense of the Hatch prohibitions it has been said, for instance, that
they rest "on the view of American political behavior that was taken by
Congressmen who may be assumed to have been politicians of considerable
experience. It may be presumed that they know something about the evils
against which they were legislating." Epstein, supra note 51, at 283. The gov-
emnment made arguments to similar effect in the Mitchell case, and the
lower court in the Mitchell case apparently had something like this in
mind when it referred to the "considered judgment of the Congress and of
the President." 56 F. Supp. 621, 627. But there is considerable evidence that
this represents an erroneous assessment of the amount of careful consideration
Congress gave to the Hatch laws. See Mosher, Government Employees Under
the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 233 (1947).
81. GODINE, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 192 (1951). Mr.
Godine believes consequently that the restrictions on political activity should
be considerably liberalized. Like several other observers however he favors
this not as something to which employees are constitutionally entitled, but
as something which the sovereign state should allow its employees as a
matter of policy. See id. at 41-42, 173-92.
82. Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46 Am. POL. ScI. REV., 808, 810
(1952).
83. Id. at 813. Professor Long maintains that "it is the balance of social
forces in the bureaucracy that enables it both to perform an important part
in the process of representation and to serve as a needed addition to a
functioning division of power in government." Id. at 817.
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between the public servant and vital public issues the Hatch Acts
militate against the development of the breadth of understanding,
outlook, and interests that members of the bureaucracy should have
in light of their strategic importance. Further, "authoritarian ad-
ministration" alongside democratic, constitutional government is an
incongruity,84 since in the former the constitutional rights of public
employees are to a great extent unrecognized. Such a situation is
not likely to help maintain a bureaucracy that holds and practices a
democratic ethos. 85 Clearly, the doctrine of political sterilization of
public servants needs to be rethought in administrative as well as
legal terms.
d. Political Justifications
Interrelated to the propositions in support of the Hatch Acts in
terms of the needs of public administration are the arguments for
them in terms of the need to safeguard the political process. Such
propositions were relied on by the Supreme Court in the Mitchell
case and by several state courts in upholding Hatch-type measures,80
and they are held by many students of public administration. The
major arguments in this regard on behalf of the prohibitions on
political activity by public employees include the following: (1)
they are essential in order to combat the evils of political machines;
(2) public employees need the protection such prohibitions afford
against being coerced into making political contributions of time or
money; and (3) in the absence of such prohibitions the party in
control of the administration might compel employees to aid the party
so that it becomes extremely difficult to defeat in an election, or a
one-party system might develop in this connection, or their may
be built up a bureaucratic "power bloc. '87 In Green v. Cleve-
land8 8 the Court advanced the novel argument that the restriction
actually was of great benefit to the employee because it would make
him "freer to express and to vote his real convictions" since he "is
protected from pressure and dictation from his superior officers .... ,,89
Here again the evils aimed at by the restrictive legislation are largely
84. See GODINE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 9.
85. "For a bureaucracy... is the core of modern government and in large
part conditions the nature of political institutions and political morality....
An authoritarian bureaucracy is not only an unfit instrument to achieve broad
democratic objectives but also it may jeopardize the very survival of repre-
sentative institutions." Id. at 10.
86. State ex inf. McKittrick ex rel. Ham v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 163 S.W.2d
990, 996 (1942); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763, 42 N.W.2d 796, 799
(1950); State ex rel. Green v. Cleveland, 33 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ohio App. 1940).
87. See Epstein, supra note 51, at 281; Esman, supra note 45, at 994-95.
88. 33 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ohio App. 1940).
89. Id. at 38. According to H. Eliot Kaplan, most of the government em-
ployees were "privately" glad to see the Hatch prohibitions enacted, as ridding
them of coercion and political exploitation. Political Neutrality of the Civil
Service, 1 PUs. PERSONNEL REV. 10, 17 (1940).
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hypothetical. But the constitutional rights severed from the in-
dividuals involved are real and they are "essential both to the status
of free citizen and to the functioning of democracy." 90 One of the
basic rationales behind the presumption of constitutionality granted
by the courts to a statute is that persons whose rights are affected
can make their appeal to the voters. The striking feature of the Hatch
Acts is that they not only remove the constitutional rights of several
million citizens, but they also cut off "opportunity to take effective
action to regain these rights." And such circumstances as these have
"in the past been considered to be peculiarly appropriate for judicial
intervention."91 Further, freedom of expression has as one of its
fundamental purposes the right of listeners to hear what is being ex-
pressed. The government cannot by definition be thought of merely
as a private employer, since it is the trustee of the public interest,
and this third party, the general public, has a constitutional interest
in the political activity of government employees. Against such
"purifications" of the political process as may result from the Hatch
Acts there must be weighed the fact that the acts at the same time
deprive the political parties and society in general of the active
participation of several million citizens in public affairs.92 It is indeed
ironical if, in order to preserve the democratic process, we must cut
off from participation the very persons who, as government em-
ployees, "are entrusted with the task of making democratic govern-
ment work."9
3
In addition to imposing direct and immediate restrictions on the
democratic process, the Hatch Acts and the rationales behind them
contain some grave implications. As Justice Black pointed out in his
dissenting opinion in the Mitchell case,94 if government employees
can be deprived of their constitutional rights because they might
"exercise, or be susceptible to, a corrupting influence on politics
or government," then it is equally supportable-in fact it is logically
necessary-to prohibit farmers, businessmen, laborers, and so on from
engaging in political activity since they clearly have a large and
direct interest in governmental subsidies, regulations, and policies.
A democracy is always open to the abuse of its instruments or the
extraction of special privileges by interest groups which gain ascendancy
among the conflicting social and economic forces operative within the
community. The political neutralization of a specific group based upon
90. Wormuth, supra note 52, at 173.
91. Id. at 168.
92. William Seal Carpenter suggests, e.g., that public employees should be
able to obtain leaves of absence to run for political positions, since their
experience in the public service would enable them to contribute to "improv-
ing the work of legislation and administration." THE UNFnISHED BUSINESS OF
CIvIL SERVICE REFORm 76 (1952).
93. Heady, supra note 51, at 699.
94. 330 U.S. at 109. And see Wormuth, supra note 52, at 169.
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the possibility of such undesirable consequences would seem to constitute
a repudiation of institutional arrangements which have become an integral
part of the apparatus of a modern democratic state.9 5
Thus the difficulties and dangers involved in the justificatory prin-
ciples of the Hatch Acts become particularly manifest when the
logical application of the same principles to other groups besides gov-
ernment employees is envisaged. In Crandall v. Nevada the Supreme
Court held invalid a state tax on the right of national citizens to
travel to national offices, even though it was a nominal tax. The Court
said that "if the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can
tax him one thousand dollars."9 6 The Mitchell decision and the Acts
it upheld seem to confirm the observation of the Court in Crandall v.
Nevada, in view of their enormously restrictive implications. For
democracy rests on the assumption that purity in government is to
be achieved not by restriction but by extension of participation .... The
direction and the ultimate tendency of the Hatch Acts are profoundly
at variance with the political principles upon which our government
rests.9 7
If there are some evils sufficiently serious and extensive as to
justify some types of restrictions on political activity of government
employees-and the courts should themselves inquire whether this
is so and not simply defer to the legislature-then it is also desirable
and appropriate for the courts to inquire as to the availability of
alternative means of accomplishing the ends sought. In the Mitchell
case the Court said that "to declare that the present supposed evils
of political activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would
leave the nation impotent to deal with what many sincere men believe
is a material threat to the democratic system."9 8 But surely the situa-
tion cannot validly be reduced to such all-or-nothing alternatives.
The same argument would support abandonment of judicial review
in every field where constitutional rights are involved. Justice
Douglas, dissenting in the Mitchell case, suggested a distinction be-
tween administrative officers and industrial employees as a basis for
deciding where restrictions on political activity should and could
95. GODINE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 186-87.
96. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 46 (1868). And see Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271
U.S. 583, 594 (1926): "If the state may compel the surrender of one con-
stitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that the guarantees embedded in the
Constitution ... may thus be manipulated out of existence."
97. Wormuth, supra note 52, at 169.
98. 330 U.S. at 95.
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constitutionally be placed.99 But this seems too broad. The political
rights of all kinds of employees are important, not only to the em-
ployees themselves but to society, and the tests applied to determine
whether restrictions are justified ought to be just as rigorous in the
case of those in any one category as of those in any other. The
different nature of employee tasks should be taken into account. But
the fact that a person is in a particular category does not justify the
assumption that restricting his right to political activity raises no
constitutional questions of the same order as in the case of those
in any other category.
It ought to be possible without the broadly restrictive provisions
of the Hatch Acts to prevent government employees from engaging
in political activities during official working hours and to prevent
them from exhibiting either the appearance or the substance of
partisanship in the course of their official duties-in those positions
where this really matters. Further, the Hatch Acts should not be
necessary for the realization of another valuable objective, the fidelity
of employees to and their cooperation with their political superiors
regardless of personal feelings or political philosophy. Here there
could well be increased reliance on the development of the ethical
standards of the public service.1 00 As the late Harold J. Laski observed
in his remarks on the British Civil Service, "loyalty and detachment
... are qualities quite distinct from political convictions and party
preferences."' 0' Congress, the President, and the administrative
agencies have an obligation to endeavor to develop rules under the
merit system which safeguard the system without denying basic
rights of public employees. Professor Laski's recommendation con-
cerning the British Civil Service seems instructive in this regard:
It is enough if an official in the Executive, or the Clerical class, give
an undertaking, whether he becomes a Parliamentary candidate or takes
an active interest in his party, not to discuss in public the affairs of the
Department to which he belongs, nor to reveal information which he
obtains by virtue of his position in the Service .... 1
02
It is certainly desirable to protect employees from being compelled
to make political contributions of time or money, whether such
contributions are to aid the administration in power to win an
99. Morton R. Godine, for instance, suggests on the other hand the possibility
of distinguishing in this regard between rank and file and supervisory per-
sonnel in practically all categories of public employment. Op cit. supra note
81, at 190. And cf. LAsxa, REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION 191-92 (1951).
According to Wallace S. Sayre, some particular categories perhaps require
special restrictions, but "all of them are small groups and their special prob-
lems cannot easily be made the basis of restrictions upon all public em-
ployees." Political Neutrality, in PUBLIc MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW DEMOCRACY
(Marx ed. 1940).
100. See Sayre, supra note 99, at 214-15.
101. Id. at 190-91.
102. Id. at 192.
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election or for any other purpose. But, as Justice Black suggested in
his dissent in the Mitchell case, if coercion is the danger, the thing
to do is to punish those who impose the coercion, instead of depriving
millions of their political rights because they might be coerced.103
It should also be possible to protect security of tenure and promotion
by merit without severing political rights in the sweeping fashion of
the Hatch Acts. There has in the past been a tendency to assume too
readily that the merit system and partisan activity by employees are
antithetical. According to Morton R. Godine,
it would be a palpable oversimplification of history and indeed a reversal
of a causal sequence of events to contend that the political activity of
civil servants was a principal factor in the emergence of the spoils system.
It is neither reasonably certain nor logical to conclude that the exercise
of political rights by civil servants in a professionalized bureaucracy
would inevitably lead to its corruption by spoilsmen. 104
It is significant that in Britain, where the doctrine of political
neutrality on the part of the civil servant had its origins, the long
term trend has been selectively to relax the prohibitions on political
activity to a very considerable extent. Britian has nothing compara-
ble to the broad prohibitions of the Hatch Acts. The restrictions that
are imposed upon public employees in this regard vary, "depending
upon the nature of their work and their relations to the public."105
It certainly cannot be denied that Britain's "concern for the values
of effective administration and political liberty is as serious and
vital as our own." 106
e. Judicial Deference to Legislative Discretion
We have seen that, although the Court in the Mitchell case relied
for support of its decision upon propositions concerning public admin-
istration and the political process, it held that these were not really
103. 330 U.S. at 113. Some commentators deny the feasibility of this. See
Epstein, supra note 51, at 283. "It would be no small matter to distinguish
between political activity that was voluntary and that which was coerced."
Cf. Esman, supra note 45, at 991.
104. GODINE, op. cit. supra note 81, at 187.
105. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 55 (1948).
106. Epstein, supra note 51, at 282. Mr. Epstein believes that the British
have been able to liberalize their system of restrictions because they have
not had to worry about the use of public employees in political machines.
The United States is not so mature, he says, as to be free from this worry
and therefore it must be cautious in lifting any of these restrictions. That is,
"in the United States it would be necessary ... to learn whether any given
portion of the government service was removed from the sphere of possible
activities of political machines." Id. at 290. This argument is indicative of
the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about the effects of political activity
by public employees on the political process. If in the last analysis the
justification of the Hatch Acts is to lie in their prevention of the possible
exploitation of government employees by political machines, the acts seem
an extremely high price to pay to meet an evil of uncertain existence and
dubious seriousness.
[ VOL. 9
1955] PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' POLITICAL ACTIVITY 49
essential considerations because the legislative decision binds the
courts on this issue. There is no limitation on Congress herein, said
the Court, except insofar as the restriction exceeds "the general
existing conception of governmental power." The Court found this
"existing conception" in part in the traditional practice of the Civil
Service Commission prohibiting political activity by civil servants. To
that extent consequently the Court rested the denial of basic con-
stitutional rights on the factual existence of certain executive prac-
tices. This clearly collides with Wilkes v. Wood,10 7 according to which
traditional executive practices do not change the law. Said Lord
Chief Justice Pratt in the Wilkes case:
It is my opinion the office precedents . . . are no justification of a
practice in itself illegal, and contrary to the fundamental principles of
the Constitution; though its having been the constant practice of the
office, might fairly be pleaded in mitigation of damages.
Whatever its views about the elements that compose the "existing
conception of governmental power," the Supreme Court was not
justified in introducing this vague doctrine as the only outer limit to
the power of Congress to take away the constitutional rights of those
who work for the government. That the courts should sustain loyalty
oaths through which the government in effect deprives men of their
livelihoods because of their thoughts, and removals from office upon
a brand of disloyalty without any procedural protection whatever,
is not a surprising development in the wake of the Mitchell decision.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court had to abandon the established path of the
constitutional law to find that the Hatch Acts do not raise problems
of constitutional rights. The privilege theory relied upon as a justifica-
tion for the departure is insupportable. Not only were the two cases
relied upon by the Court as precedents inappropriate, but the major
precedent, Ex parte Curtis, actually is in contradiction to the Mitchell
case. Although the acts were designed to achieve safeguards con-
cerning government administration and our political process, there
is considerable uncertainty as to the existence of the particular evils
aimed at. Such benefits as may be derived from the acts are not
persuasive when weighed against the loss of constitutional rights, the
restrictions on the democratic process, and the adverse effects on
the public service itself. Moreover, there is abundant reason to
believe that all of the really significant problems the Hatch Acts
were designed to meet may be adequately coped with by means far
107. Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 19 State Trials 1154, 1167 (C.P. 1763).
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less drastic than those acts. Congress, state legislatures and adminis-
trative authorities ought to observe extreme caution in imposing
restrictions on the constitutional rights of any government em-
ployees. 0 8 The courts ought likewise to be extremely scrupulous
in considering the constitutionality of such legislation. In short, the
Mitchell decision ought to be overruled and the courts ought to uphold
only those restrictive statutes or rules which they find narrowly
drawn to meet a specific and sufficiently grave evil that is not remote
in its possibilities.
108. See Heady, supra note 51, at 699. He suggests as a "guide for re-
examination" of the Hatch Acts "that public employees should be shorn of
political privileges [as he regards them] only when correspondingly sub-
stantial benefits accrue to the civil service system."
